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Abstract 
The theory of affordances has been around for many years, and is the foundation of the 
growing field of ecological psychology.  What makes it more relevant, and more widely 
relevant today is that the way we perceive, act and interact in the internet society has 
changed, opened up and become dynamic on a global scale.  This paper situates 
‘affordances’ within an ecological framework based on complexity theory, and outlines the 
way in which Gibson sought to put perception ‘back into the world’, rather than seeing it 
as a purely cognitive matter, by formulating the concept of affordances as the product of 
interactions between the actor and the environment.  Affordances are based on self-
organisation, and are associated with change, adaptation and innovation.  This chapter 
outlines in some detail how we can distinguish between affordances and uses, and how 
affordances relate to metaphors, science and, importantly, identity, communities and 
networks.  Several scenarios are explored from various kinds of political violence and 
terrorism, to test the idea of affordances in practice.  There is also the question of whether 
the modes of production of the internet society provide the basis not only for a  range of 
affordances in particular contexts, but also in a much wider range of emerging, global, 
contexts.  Knorr-Cetina’s theory of ‘microglobal structures’ provides examples of just such 
emerging, flexible, global structures, in finance and terrorism, and these are explored at 
some length, to draw out the implications for political violence and terrorism.   
 
 
  
Introduction 
The increasing use of ‘affordances’ in educational research, human computer interface 
design, and  psychology (Laurillard et al 2000, Costall 2008, Norman 1999,  Noë 2008)  
marks a shift into a more explicitly ecological
1
 framework for describing and analysing 
perception, action, learning and innovation.  Ecologies in this sense are self-organising, 
interactive, adaptive, and thrive on variance and redundancy
2
.  In ecologies, ‘survival of the 
fittest’ means the fittest to adapt to changes in the environment, and even to adapt the 
environment itself, rather than ‘survival of the strongest’.    
 
 Affordances are more than just passive or objective opportunities that the environment or 
the technology offers: affordances are not ‘in’ the environment, but ‘in’ your interaction 
with it.  It might be useful to start with an example: the Two Times Table.  
 
The Two Times Table.    
Take two scenarios:  In scenario A an adult comes into a room and sees a table, chairs and 
a table cloth. The adult says: “That’s great, there’s a nice table and table cloth, so with a bit 
of rearranging, and some better lighting, I can invite some friends over and we can have a 
dinner party”.   In scenario B a four year old child comes into the same room, and says 
“That’s a problem. The table is too high for me to draw on, but too low to walk under, as 
I’m likely to bump my head. But wait a minute, if I turn it upside down, and throw the cloth 
over the top of the legs.  I can invite some friends round, and we’ll have a great house to 
play in”.  
 
The room, the table and the table cloth are the same in both scenarios. The affordances 
are radically different, and in practice they conflict with each other. The affordances are 
the opportunities that the room offers the particular people in each scenario for making 
sense of, and acting in that environment, using the same space and materials, but in quite 
different ways
3
. The adult and the child’s individual and social identities and positions are 
inseparable from the way they perceive and act within them and use them, within a micro-
community.  
 
                                                           
1
 The ecological framework is based on complex adaptive systems theory (CAST), see for instance 
Cilliers (2005).  
2
 See Blackmore (2008) for an introduction to the broader issues, and to the three ecological 
replicators:  genes, ‘memes’ and ‘temes’.  
3
 It is hypothetically possible to make an exhaustive list of all the potential affordances in a 
particular context.  In practice it is impossible, as you never know who is going to turn up next in 
that environment, and self-organising agents often produce unpredictable outcomes (see Cilliers 
2005 on CAST).  
 
Depending on the outcomes of the uses of the table in the two scenarios, the child and the 
adult’s identities will be enhanced or bruised afterwards. They may re-assess whether 
these affordances are desirable. Their learning and their identities are interdependent in 
more ways than one. Some of the affordances that they explore, benchmark and master 
will be put behind them as unfortunate ‘learning experiences’, while other affordances will 
become integral to their ongoing identities. They may also develop a community of like-
minded people who share and consolidate their affordances within a micro-community.  
 
Why Affordances, and Why Now?  
Affordances are the product of interactions between an actor
4
 and its environment. Each 
interaction contributes to the way the actor makes sense of the environment, and 
potentially changes both actor and environment.   
 
These interactions may depend on particular properties of the actor and/or the 
environment, but the properties of either the actor or environment, necessary though they 
may be, are not sufficient for the affordance to be realised; affordances are realised within 
the interaction between actor and environment.  In other words, an affordance is 
something that is only realised when you carry out an action
5
.   And that, in turn, may 
depend on the creativity and the mettle of the individual concerned.   
 
There are several reasons why the term affordance is both relevant and timely for our 
understanding of political violence and terrorism in general, as well as in the particular 
political ecologies of the digitally networked world of the 21
st
 Century.  If we start off with 
a definition of affordances as the product of interactions between an agent and its 
environment, we can identify some of the key elements of affordances, its development, 
and why it is relevant now.   
 
 Perception  
Affordances provide us with a rigorous reformulation of the nature of perception, which is 
fundamental to the way people see and act within politics and within society. The idea of 
active-perception, or perceptive-action is based on the work of Gibson, who invented the 
term affordances, and whose work gave rise to Ecological Psychology, which in many ways 
cuts across and resolves some of the dichotomies between Behavioural and Cognitive 
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 ‘Actor’: i.e. in the broadest sense of the term, including even organisations.  
 
5
 It is of course possible to distinguish between affordances and potential affordances, but this is 
dependent on the imagination and skills of the person concerned, and the time and context that 
prevails, all of which are variable. So potential affordances might not actually be useful in practice, 
and it might be better to focus on actual affordances instead.   
psychology.  Gibson writes that affordances are the realisation of both the ‘objective’ 
properties of an artefact and the subjective properties of a particular use for a particular 
user: “An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to 
understand its inadequacy.  It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behaviour.  
It is both physical and psychical, yet neither.  An affordance points both ways, to the 
environment and to the observer” (1977: 129).  
 
Several researchers have built on Gibson’s work, and have developed and consolidated the 
concept of ‘affordances’, which now emphasises both Gibson’s active perception, as well as 
the notion that perception is embodied, social and  interactive, even from the earliest, pre-
linguistic stages of development.  For instance, Noë writes that: “our ability to perceive not 
only depends on, but is constituted by, our possession of … sensori-motor knowledge. … 
perceiving is a kind of skillful bodily activity … perception … is not a process in the brain, 
but a kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole” (2006: 3).  
 
Costall emphasises the social embeddedness of affordances. He writes that “affordances 
are not just relative to us, but relate to us … objects have been shaped … designed … they 
have a place in relation to definite cultural practices … the reality that is known is already a 
social reality” (1985:477).   
 
And Reed provides evidence for the fundamental nature of active/perception, right from 
pre-linguistic infants.  He writes that infants’ actively structure the environment, not just 
‘perceive’ it or even just ‘participate’ in it. “All social animals actively structure their 
environment …including infants interacting with their caretakers after 6 months … the one 
year old child is not only capable of acts of joint attention (+) with her caretaker, she is 
capable of promoting attention and action to specific aspects (+) of their shared attention 
[even though] the child’s means for directing the attention of others are largely non-verbal 
(+) (Reed 1993: 8-9, cited and discussed further in Williams 2009: 15).  Noë supports this 
‘enactive’, or ‘embodied’ view of active/perception.  He writes that perception is 
embedded in sensori-motor skills.  “Perception is an activity of exploring the environment, 
drawing on an understanding of the ways in which one’s movement effects one’s sensory 
relations to things …  perception is a kind of knowledgeable or thoughtful exploration of 
the environment.  Indeed, thought, like perception, is a kind of skilful access to the world 
itself (Noë, 2008: 663-4).  A discussion of more recent issues can be found in Costal and 
Dreier’s book, Doing things with things (2009).   
 
 
 
Self-organised adaptation  
Ecological psychology, in turn, has drawn on some of the fundamental aspects of evolution  
and in particular on complexity theory (or complex adaptive systems theory, CAST) to 
understand the nature of active, embodied and environmentally embedded action and 
perception, and the link between self-organisation, replication and adaptation (Rihani, 
2002; , Blackmore,2008). This is based on a correct understanding of Darwin’s notion of the 
“survival of the fittest”, viz. survival of the fittest to adapt (and evolve), rather than survival 
of the strongest.  In evolutionary terms, the evolution of new species is essential; cloning is 
literally a dead end.  
 
Variance and Innovation 
Variance and diversity are key to innovation and adaptation.  This allows for the expression 
of variance in behaviour in the ‘same’ kind of actors, even in the ‘same’ circumstances.  
This is based on variance at a number of cumulative levels including: variance in the 
genetic code and in its expression in reproduction and in behaviour; variance in the 
linguistic code (the way sounds are combined into words) and in the meaning that 
different communities ascribe to signs; and variance in the digital codes which sample and 
represent digital media in various ways, at various resolutions, and the flexible ways in 
which digital media can be combined and reworked.   
At each stage in this evolutionary development, the process of coding and abstraction 
makes a new range, and a new kind of variation, distinction, combination and 
recombination possible, ending up in the complex ‘mashups’ of digital media, social 
software, and virtual worlds in which even identity can be varied and reinvented endlessly.   
It is this multi-level, globally networked environment that provides the unprecedented 
variation, interaction and access to information and networks that is the foundation for the 
affordances of the 21
st
 Century.  
Let us explore some of these affordances by looking at scenarios from insurgency, counter-
insurgency and terrorism.   However, it might be useful to discuss some of the terms first.   
 
Terrorism and Political Violence 
There is “no single definition of terrorism that commands full international approval, 
although the FBI definition: ’the use of serious violence against persons or property, or 
threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce ’” has some virtues (Taylor 2010, citing 
the work of Carlile 2007).  Schwartz et al use a simpler definition: “the deliberate targeting 
of civilian sites for attacks, designed to result in the destruction of those sites and/or the 
injury and death of non-combatant civilians” (2009: 537-8), which will be used in this 
discussion.  Targeting civilians is an extraordinary thing to do, and it raises questions about 
the kind of context that gives rise to it.   
Several researchers on terrorism identify issues of identity as key.  Erikson writes that 
“when historical and technological development … severely encroach upon deeply rooted 
identity … on a large scale, youth feel endangered … whereupon it becomes ready to 
support … a collective condemnation of a totally stereotyped enemy … which becomes 
available for organised terror and for the establishment of major industries of 
extermination” (1993: 89, quoted in Swartz et al 2009: 547).  The dividing line between 
terrorism and political violence is not as clearly defined, so a provisional distinction will be 
used, namely that terrorism necessarily includes ‘non-combatant’ casualties, whereas 
‘political violence’ at least makes an attempt to avoid civilian casualties, although the same 
does not apply to civilian ‘assets’ (in the military sense of the word). 
This chapter will not enter into the debate about the causes of terrorism or political 
violence in any detail, but it might nevertheless be useful to sketch out some of the more 
obvious implications of the above formulations.  First, there would seem to be a link 
between a perceived threat to the (civilian) identity of a group, and its attempt to retaliate 
by threatening the civilian population and/or assets of the other party.  Second, this seems 
to be applicable to conflict between states (either in times of war or peace), between 
groups (‘sectarian’ conflict), and between a groups and a state or states.  Third, this seems 
to be applicable to what in the Apartheid conflict was called ‘structural violence’, i.e. 
systematic administrative violation of a whole range of civil, political, and human rights 
against a (majority) group by a (minority) regime – an  analysis which could well be 
applicable to many other contexts, including several countries in the Middle East.  Forth, 
these first three criteria could be applicable to conflict between major powers, but they 
are probably more applicable to ‘asymmetric’ conflict, i.e. where mainstream channels for 
political participation and change are perceived to be closed or irrelevant.   
 Scenarios 
It might be useful to describe some scenarios in which we can explore relationships 
between the kind of affordances that are available to people, and the way in which this 
intersects with issues of identity, possible threats to identity, and possible responses and 
retaliation.  It is not possible within this chapter to explore the ways in which identity is 
maintained or threatened, and the role of perceptions and propaganda in this process.  
Suffice it to say that there is a body of research on the role of cultural and political 
narratives in this process, (e.g. Knorr-Cetina [2005] on Al Qaeda’s narratives), which 
broadly agrees with Taylor and Horgan (2006) that it is more useful to see terrorism not as 
a socio- or psycho- pathology, but rather as a “process”, which might best be countered if 
we can “change the choices made for the potential terrorist from violence to other means 
of [political] expression” (p586).   
 
The three scenarios are: the Afghan farmer’s dilemma, the Insurgent’s election dilemma 
and the Religious fundamentalist’s dilemma.  The Afghan farmer’s dilemma is an 
illustration of one of the most threatening ways of opposing the Western alliance’s 
presence in Afghanistan:  IED’s (Improvised Explosive Devices); the insurgent’s election 
dilemma illustrates the way civilian populations are often caught up in asymmetric conflict, 
and the Religious fundamentalist’s dilemma, although it can be seen in many different 
ways, impacts directly on the issue of the ‘slaughter of the innocents’.  These scenarios will 
be briefly described here, then the issue of affordances will be discussed in a more detailed 
framework, after which these scenarios will be discussed at more length.   
 
A.  The Afghan farmer’s dilemma 
The farmer in Afghanistan has the opportunity to acquire fertiliser.  He can be a successful 
farmer by combining specific chemical potentials of the fertiliser with:  i), the potential 
legal market for potatoes, or ii) the potential illegal market for opium. Or iii), he can try to 
become a hero in the insurgency, by combining other potentials of these chemicals with 
the potential for military disruption and battlefield victory, by making IED’s.  A range of 
people may become wealthy, die or be killed as a consequence of the realisation of these 
three scenarios, including adults and children, possibly specifically targeted, but possibly 
random.  
 
 
B. The insurgent’s election dilemma 
The insurgent in Vietnam, or Sierra Leone, is faced with a dispersed, rural, civilian 
population, which from time to time is invited (and/or coerced) by the government of the 
day to participate in elections, and thereby legitimise the current regime.  The insurgents 
can send a powerful message to the rural population as a whole that they participate in 
elections at their peril, by cutting off the hands or arms of people in villages which voted in 
the election.     
 
C. The religious fundamentalist’s dilemma  
The religious fundamentalist can ensure their own honour and esteem within an earthly 
and spiritual community by combining their own ability to sacrifice their lives with the 
potential for causing havoc in public places, including the random killing of innocents who 
happen to be at that location at the time.  
 In all these cases there are many different affordances that may or may not be realised, 
many possible consequences, and many communities and discourses
6
are involved.  The 
actual consequences of these actions will, inevitably, be accepted and endorsed in some 
communities, and rejected in others.  The consequences may also change the status of the 
actors and of their actions in those communities: they may become heroes or outcasts.  In 
addition, the actors themselves may be changed by the consequences of their actions, and 
they may or may not be willing to carry out, or even endorse, similar actions in the future.  
 
Affordances are realised at the point of interaction of an actor with the environment, but 
they are carried out within the ongoing maintenance and development of the actor’s 
identity within social communities and discourses.  Realising affordances is not a 
hypothetical exercise.  It leads to consequences, depending on what you want to be, or are 
prepared to become, and in what community.  Affordances are also realised against the 
backdrop and heritage of social memes and cultures, which are crucial parts of the social 
environment in which interactions take place.  In answer to Costall’s question (1995) as to 
whether affordances are social, the answer is yes, they are, although they are also at the 
same time individual (see Costall and Gibson, above).  
 
Affordances are realised within a biological and social ecology, often within more than one 
social community, or discourse.  Affordances are ecological in the sense that they are 
adaptive and new, at least for a particular actor or set of actors at the time. They are 
innovative, and are differentiated from existing uses and norms, although they may 
become new norms in due course.  Affordances are capabilities that the actor/s may 
realise, by deploying options within their own capacity, in relation to the potential of what 
they perceive to be available to them in the environment.  But affordances have 
consequences for other affordances, and for the affordances of others.  Evolution 
produces its own share of collateral damage.  
 
Affordances and Uses 
Artefacts, by definition, have uses.  Anthropologically, things that are used as ad hoc 
implements become ‘tools’ by repeated use by individuals in a community.  As Barthes says 
of signs, (1977): “every use becomes a sign of itself”.  This applies to all uses and signs, 
whether they are linguistic (e.g. new slang, new scientific terminology) or material.  
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 Discourse: this is used in the Critical theory sense, to mean “a set of practices and alliances which 
organises texts and bodies (animate and inanimate) in the interests of a particular community” – for 
instance: professional organisations, academic disciplines, and business organisations (legal or 
illegal), (Williams 1992).   
 
 Artefacts are not just used, but are made, designed, manufactured, etc, and are created 
with particular uses, and users ‘in mind’, for ‘later’ and/or for ‘elsewhere’ in a community.  
In other words, they depend on a theory of mind, of time and of space, all of which are 
socially mediated; as Noë says (see above), “perception is a kind of knowledgeable or 
thoughtful exploration of the environment.  Indeed, thought, like perception, is a kind of 
skilful access to the world itself” (2008: 663-4).   
 
However, the artefact’s potential uses and affordances are seldom exhausted by this 
process.  People may always find different uses for an artefact, e.g. the “woman who used 
her walking stick as a telephone” (Forchhammer 2006).  She used it to bang on the ceiling 
of her apartment, to tell the neighbours upstairs that she was ready to be taken on her 
weekly shopping trip.   
 
What we identify here as affordances are the realisation of a selection of some of the 
‘objective’ properties of the artefact, in interaction with some of the properties of the 
particular user; in the case above, the woman is still able to stand up straight enough to 
bang on the ceiling.  “An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective – it 
is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of [particular] behaviour” (Gibson 1977: 
129), and this results in an extension to the actor’s skilful access to the world, that may 
surprise even herself. 
 
In more detail, we can add that the affordances of an artefact include potential uses that 
may be: inherent, designed, assembled, disaggregated and re-assembled, emergent, or 
creative.  The properties of the user include competencies, capability, and identity and 
willingness to act in a particular context, and a particular community.  Capability, in turn, is 
defined for our purposes here as including physical, technical, psychological, social and 
ethical abilities and commitments.    
 
Let us apply this to our three scenarios.  Note that the global network of the internet plays 
a role across many of these scenarios – to provide information, to establish and maintain 
virtual and actual communities, to profile organisations to the world.  
 
The fertiliser in scenario A has several chemical properties, and the outcome depends on 
what other chemicals are combined with the chemicals in the fertiliser. The realisation of 
explosive affordances in IED’s may or may not achieve hero status for the farmer, 
depending on the reaction of the community to the consequences of particular explosions.  
The farmer’s capability to make and deploy IED’s will depend on all of these factors, on the 
information he can acquire directly or indirectly from the Internet and other sources, as 
well as his own reaction to the explosion, and whether he, personally, remains ‘capable’ of 
deploying IED’s in the future.   
 
The affordances that are available to him, to embark on terror (putting civilians as well as 
the enemy at risk) are of course technical, but they can only be realised within the 
community, which will make its own judgement on whether the risk (and possible civilian 
damages and casualties) are worth it, or not.  IED’s are only an affordance insofar as the 
affordance ‘works’ for both the actor and the group that he or she is part of.  If not, the 
same IED could turn out to be a dis-fordance for both the actor and the group.  
 
The amputation of hands or limbs in scenario B is technically challenging – the amputee 
has to survive for this affordance to be realised; the dis-fordance of being an amputee 
merges, in a macabre way, with the affordances of the insurgent’s warning to others.  The 
‘traces’ that are inscribed on the amputee are similar to the ‘traces’ that are inscribed in 
the media coverage (and recordings) of the spectacular propaganda of the deed in other 
contexts, such as 9/11.  These traces function as a ‘text’ to communicate terror to others.  
In this scenario, the affordance can be ethically and psychologically challenging at a 
personal level; it depends on whether the person doing the amputation is ‘capable’ of such 
actions at the time, is comfortable with the results, and is willing to do so again, or not.  In 
cases like this the borderline between affordances and dis-fordances for the insurgent is 
very fine, and potentially unstable.  The immediate affordances could even backfire, if the 
‘terror’ of the amputation of children’s limbs mobilises the international community to 
intervene, more so than it mobilises (or coerces) the rural population to stop voting.  
Affordances are ecological, and therefore each realisation of an affordance potentially 
affects the knowledge, identity and status of the actor concerned, and can affect the 
broader social environment – positively or negatively.   
 
One of the advantages of describing these kinds of events in ecological terms, using the 
concept of affordances, is that actions are seen as adaptive, and to have an effect (positive 
or negative) within a context which is, in turn, adaptive.  The context is part of a wider 
social ecology, so there are potential knock-on effects between various micro-contexts, as 
well as between particular micro-contexts and a range of broader contexts, both 
immediately and over time.  This means that the observer has no guarantee that they will 
be able to predict future outcomes too accurately; but what can be observed are trends, in 
mutually adaptive relationships between actors and contexts.  An ecological approach does 
not preclude the identification of predictable outcomes, it just provides a potentially 
rigorous methodology for dealing with those particular situations in which, to use the 
terms of complexity theory, “actor and structure co-evolve” (Cilliers, 2005).  
 
The fundamentalist’s scenario (C) is even more complicated (or simpler, depending on how 
you look at it).  He or she has to be capable of committing suicide, and being able to justify 
this in terms of a metaphysical community, which invariably includes dilemmas, for 
instance between the slaughter of innocents and the waging of holy crusades – issues 
which can often only be resolved by choosing between different temporal interpreters and 
interpretations of the ‘same’ holy texts.    
 
These are hard choices, in terms of action and personal identity. The negotiation of identity 
within shifting contexts of conflict, particularly of insurgency, where uncertain boundaries 
are one of the contested issues, is difficult.  Decisions that are taken to realise specific 
affordances in these contexts are complex and often emotionally difficult because of family 
ties, and because of the risks involved in targeting random civilians, some of whom may 
turn out to be people the actor would not like to target.  This paradoxically makes the 
restricted affordances of absolute religious doctrine potentially attractive to suicide 
bombers, as it removes any ambiguity by providing a restricted and metaphysical 
framework, which removes any considerations of ‘this’ world, because it has been replaced 
by the ‘next’ one.   
 
This means that in different contexts quite different kinds of affordances may be attractive 
– in terms of doctrine, the more restricted the affordances, the better for the suicide 
bomber – by restricting ambiguity and providing clarity. But in terms of technical 
possibilities, the more flexible the better, so that the bomb-makers’ options are not 
restricted, and the precise type of bomb they make might be (somewhat) less predictable 
to counter-terrorism personnel.   
 
Working Definition  
So what are affordances?   
 
An Affordance is the product of interactions between a person and their 
environment, each of which potentially alters their knowledge, competencies and 
identity, and potentially alters the (micro-) environment, consolidating or 
disrupting elements within it.   
 
Affordances are closely linked to the processes of learning and innovation, both of which 
involve: exploring, creating, benchmarking and mastering new affordances. Affordances 
are about change and adaptation (See figure 1 & 2, below).  But it is not helpful to call 
everything an affordance (Norman 1999), as the term then loses its specificity, and 
language becomes clumsy.   We can start by distinguishing between affordances and uses, 
and by mapping out the relationship between the two terms (figure 1).    
 
Sometimes things and resources just get used, taken at face value, with no regard to the 
broader possibilities of potential affordances: for example, a walking stick, which is used 
for exactly that – to assist in walking.  As Costall says, “objects have been shaped, even 
deliberately designed ... they have a ‘place’ in relation to definite cultural practices, and 
‘represent’ various human practices; their reliable and safe functioning depends on a social 
system of mutual responsibilities and obligations” (1995: 476-477). However, even the 
uses of the walking stick can be extended and extrapolated, as it potentially has 
affordances to be used ’in lieu of a telephone’ (see above).  It also has potential 
affordances to be modified into a ‘shooting stick’, and to be used for sitting on; the 
shooting stick in turn has potential affordances for being used as a gun rest, for shooting, 
and so on.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1:  Affordances and Uses 
 
Affordances are the product of the intersection between the subjective and the objective, 
or the properties of the actor and artefacts in the environment.  Insofar as these properties 
are new to an actor, they are perceived as new affordances for that actor, but once the 
actor becomes a member of a group who routinely use the artefact for the same function 
as everyone else, it becomes a use.  However, one particular use (as in ‘assisting walking’) 
can be modified or extended, as new potentials are explored, created, realised, and 
consolidated, in new contexts.  The new contexts, similarly, are defined by, and are a 
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product of, the intersection between the ‘subjective and the objective’ – the use of a 
walking stick as a telephone will not ‘come to mind’ to all elderly women who need to 
coordinate their shopping with the tenants in the apartment above them, and some of 
them would not be able to reach their ceiling to knock on it, even if they wanted to do so.   
 
So affordances, once broadly established, become uses, which in turn feed into the next 
iteration of affordances, either on their own, in modified forms or functions, or in 
combination with other uses and affordances, possibly even in new inventions (see figure 
3)
7
.  In this way affordances, innovations and uses percolate through the social ecology:  
sometimes fading out, and sometimes emerging as newly established memes (cultural 
micro-practices), like shooting sticks, or even Blackmore’s temes (micro-practices based on 
technologically more complex artefacts like mobile phones), which have to operate within 
complex mobile cellular networks.  However, the transitions between affordances and uses 
can be very confusing.  This applies particularly with changes like the restructuring of 
private and public space, which happens with the introduction of mobile phones (Williams 
2007).   
 
Both memes and temes have a tendency to take on a life of their own, and spread ‘virally’: 
by what used to be called ‘word of mouth’ but which can now take place instantly and 
exponentially within the ‘scale-free’ media of the Internet.  (Scale-free networks are 
networks which allow for exponential communication and spread throughout a global 
network, at very low cost or effort).  The spread of (micro-) news videos, recorded on 
mobile telephones, e.g. at the Mumbai massacre in India in 2008, are now common 
examples of instant, ‘scale-free’, global dissemination, which takes place outside the 
structures and constraints of traditional news organisations, and often outside the 
regulatory control of nation states.   
 
More pertinent to terrorism is the example of the practice of ’Necklacing’,  i.e.  burning 
informants alive, with car tyres placed over their upper arms. This spread rapidly within the 
Apartheid struggle in the 1970’s and 80’s, as Winnie Mandela infamously pronounced 
“with our little boxes of matches, we will liberate this country”.  There is a whole subset of 
affordances that relates to asymmetries of power, and the means of pursuing asymmetric 
                                                           
7
 An interesting example of how ‘affordances’ become ‘uses’ can be found in Blackmore (2008)’s  
presentation on memes and temes.  Like genes, memes (cultural algorithms, as it were) and temes 
(technological algorithms) spread almost ‘virally’.  Their usefulness is so apparent, and so 
immediate, that they are adopted quickly and widely within, or even across cultures.  And there are 
interesting parallels to be drawn between genes and memes and temes.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2:  Identity, Capability and Power 
 
conflict.  Few of these more extreme affordances (such as the 9/11 attacks or Necklacing) 
pass into common ‘usage’ by definition, but they remain important affordances that 
people may choose to re-establish in particular circumstances.  Kitchener’s scorched earth 
and concentration camp innovations in the South African wars at the turn of the 20
th
 
Century, for instance, were eventually ‘effective’, but increasingly difficult to justify 
internationally.  A later version of this, the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, was probably 
seen as a powerful affordance at the beginning of the American involvement there, but 
might have become a dis-fordance later on, particularly in the eyes of the international 
public.    
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The point is that we need to  distinguish between (established) uses and (emergent) 
affordances
8
, although we must keep in mind that a use which is new to a particular person 
can be seen as an affordance for them – in other words, the process of transformation 
from an innovative affordance to an established use happens at both individual and social 
levels.  And this is not merely a technical or a strategic issue; ethics often play an important 
role, as in the disagreements in both the second world war and the recent Gaza/Israeli 
conflict about the retaliatory bombing of civilian areas.   
 
We also need to make a distinction between active and prescribed perception.   Active- 
perception /or/ perceptive-action is creative and interactive;  it is curious about different 
properties and possibilities, both in the immediate context and in other actual or 
hypothetical contexts. On the other hand, a perception that goes no further than existing, 
prescribed uses confines the person (and the artefact) to instrumental action and 
normative compliance
9
.  
 
Identity, Capability and Power 
As we have seen in the scenarios above, and in the section on variance and innovation, 
affordances are both individual and social.  They involve personal choices, will and 
capability, but also require a context and a community within which to develop and 
maintain that ‘capability’.   Now that we have established a basic model which allows us to 
track and describe how uses and affordances percolate through the social ecology (fig. 1), 
we can go into more detail, and sketch out the relationships between identity, capability 
and power (see fig.2).  
 
New affordances not only feed into new uses (and possibly new memes and temes), but 
they also feed into metaphors (within informal learning), and science (within formal 
learning and research) both of which provide new ideas for new resources, as well as the 
stimulus and provocation for further affordances (see figure 2).  The physicist 
Oppenheimer, for instance, when asked by a colleague why he developed the atom bomb, 
replied: “it was just such a beautiful experiment”.  Oppenheimer had to wrestle with the 
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 Norman, writing about GUI’s (graphic user interfaces) makes a similar point, and differentiates 
affordances from conventions, symbols and constraints, all of which are valuable in guiding 
behaviour (1999: 40). 
 
9
 In the strong sense of Gibson’s use of ‘affordances’ of course, there is no such thing as ‘prescribed’ 
perception; all perception is active.  In practice, however, there are choices to be made, choices 
which under duress might confine perception to prescription and compliance.  This was the case for 
many Germans under Nazism, which was of particular concern to Gibson, who asked why ‘direct’ 
perception about the evils of the holocaust, free from the hegemony of mass media propaganda 
was seemingly not possible at the time. 
 
consequences of this new affordance and capability throughout the rest of his life.  He was 
lauded for producing ‘the A-bomb’, then pilloried for years for speaking out in favour of 
constraints on its use and later a moratorium on developing the H-bomb, and in favour of 
strategic arms limitation negotiations (Bird & Sherwin 2008).   
 
The distinction between uses and affordances is also the basis for the distinction between 
‘tool users’ and ‘tool makers’ that defines human culture and human intelligence, which in 
turn can be creative or macabre.  Uses can be transformed into different uses, into 
exchange, into capital, into symbols.  Hands, for instance, can be used to vote, or can be 
cut off as a warning to others.  Buildings can be used for World Trade, or for what 
Stockhausen infamously called the devil’s “finest work of art”.  A mother’s concern for her 
baby can be turned into a cruel instrument for attention, in Munchausen’s Syndrome by 
Proxy, in which the mother repeatedly seeks attention for herself as a carer, by 
deliberately making her child ill, and thus in need of  more caring.   
 
Costall and Dreier (2006) similarly distinguish between innovative and established uses, 
but they use the term ‘functional affordances’ instead of ‘uses’, which works well in the 
more theoretical context of their book.  However, for our purposes here, the term ‘use’ 
seems more appropriate.   The tension between the theoretical term, ‘affordances’, and 
the common sense term ‘use’ captures the relationship between creative and routine 
practice well - what Wenger calls the relationship between emergence and reification 
(2009).  
 
 
This shifts the framework a bit from previous work; and affordances can now be defined as 
follows:  
 
• An affordance exists in a reciprocal relationship between the objective properties 
of the environment, and the action capabilities of a particular actor to perceive 
and realise that affordance. (Gibson 1977). 
 
• Affordances are dynamic, and even unstable.  Different actors may perceive, 
explore, create and exploit quite different and even contrary affordances in the 
same environment, using the same resources.  Affordances develop along with, 
and as a result of, interaction between the actor and the environment, both of 
which may change over time.   
 
• One person’s affordance is another person’s ‘disfordance’, so what is initially an 
affordance may turn out to be a disfordance for others, or even a disfordance for 
that same person at a later stage.  In addition, what you are actually ‘capable of’ 
and willing to do, can change (see the example of Oppenheimer, above).  
 
• Affordances are based on active/perception, and “perceiving is a kind of skillful  
bodily activity. … perception … is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful 
activity on the part of the animal as a whole (Noë 2006: 3, above).  
 
Gibson (as well as several of the other authors cited in this chapter) are concerned with  
developing an alternative account of what had traditionally been an almost exclusive 
emphasis on the cognitive aspects of perception, as if it all happened in the head, so to 
speak, and none of it happened ‘in the world’.  The problem is perhaps best illustrated by 
the fact that many years after Gibson’s seminal work, we still have no single term for 
perceptive-action, or active-perception
10
, although ‘embodied perception’ and ‘enactive 
perception (Noë 2006) go some of the way to achieving this.  
   
 
Identities 
Affordances are relational and interactive, so the subjective active/perception of the actor, 
which ‘places’ both the actor and his or her affordances in a social context, is an integral 
aspect of affordances.  Developing, realising and expanding your repertoire of affordances 
is not only skilful and thoughtful, but it is also ontological – it constitutes, in large part, who 
you are and who you become – in short, your identity.  
 
Erikson (1993, see above) links fundamental threats to identity directly to the possibilities 
of embarking on terror.  We can now link all of this.  Affordances are important aspects of 
identity (see also Williams et al 2009, which goes a bit further, and argues that “identity 
can be seen as a repertoire of affordances”).  Threats to identity, which are perceived as 
fundamental, can prompt actors to engage in terror
11
. Unacceptable as this may be, it is 
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 There is an extensive discussion of the arguments against ‘cognitivism’ in the affordances debate 
in the unpublished paper: ‘The Ecological Turn: Affordances for Learning Research’ (Williams 2009).  
This is a theoretical and rather subject-specific discussion, but it points out that there is a substantial 
body of work which still sees perception as almost exclusively cognitive, rather than interactive, for 
reasons which are highly contested.  Gibson’s work can in many ways be seen as a rejection of the 
binarism and limitations of cognitive psychology on the one hand, and behavioural psychology on 
the other, as he attempts to account for human action more holistically.  
 
11
 There seem to be at least two ways to interpret what Erikson is saying here.  On the one hand, he 
could be referring to the actor who carries out terror against the state, but on the other hand, he 
could be referring to the state (and particularly the Nazi state) carrying out terror against the 
not surprising.  If we consider that a perceived threat to identity is a threat to the culture, 
and the (civilian) life of a particular group of people, it can make sense to these people to 
respond in a way that threatens the (civilian) life of the people making the threat to their 
identity in the first place.      
 
It would be useful, then, to explore the relationship between affordances and identity, and 
the way they interact in social and political ecologies in more detail.  
 
We have argued that affordances are relational, interactive and integral parts of larger 
ecologies.  They are, in the first instance, personal – although they clearly can be, and often 
are, shared by others in which case they may become uses, cultural ‘memes’ and routine 
practices, which are embedded in technological systems and networks (see ‘temes’, 
above).   
 
Figure 3 sketches out the way that identity is constituted, edited, revised, re-arranged and 
re-aligned, viz-a-via affordances, based on the following:   
 
• Competence:  the ability to use resources and tools for specific functions.  
• Curiosity, Adaptation and Innovation: the interest and the willingness to explore, 
create, benchmark and master new affordances  (i.e. affordances which may be new to 
you, individually, and/or may be new to everyone).  
• Capability: what you are capable of doing, and willing to continue to do in existing and 
in new contexts.   
  
Your repertoire of affordances is reflected in your capability - what you are able, interested 
and, most importantly, willing to carry out.  It includes the history and memories of how 
you acquired the affordances, which leaves conscious and sub-conscious traces and 
legacies – positive and negative - in the actor, as well as in other people and texts in the 
environment.  You act within your identities, within various communities and networks
12
, 
and within professional and cultural discourses, all of which are potentially different, and 
may make conflicting demands on you.  You exercise power within some of these 
                                                                                                                                                                   
various threats to the purity of the core (‘Aryan’) national identity, drawing on religious, mythical 
and ‘civilian’ narratives (of euthanasia and pseudo-Darwinism  - see Bauman, 1989).   
 
12
 Etienne Wenger (2009) has developed an excellent framework and practice in which he explores 
the relationships between identity, community and networks.  He sees learning and identity as 
inseparable, which is one of the threads running through some of the debates on affordances, and 
which emerged strongly in the Affordances for Learning research (Williams et al 2009). 
 
communities and networks, based on your identities, your networks, and your access to 
technical capacity. In more particular terms, power is exercised within discourses
13
.  
 
Life/Death 
Many communities, and the affordances within them, are characterised - if not determined 
- by the relationship between life and death, and the willingness of the actor to put their 
own life, and/or the lives of others, on the line.  Ghandi’s politics of ‘non’-violence, 
Satyagraha, included an explicit willingness to die, which he frequently operationalised in 
his ‘ticking time-bomb’ fasts, a tactic shared by many political prisoners.  Mandela summed 
his attitude up at the ‘Rivonia’ trial in 1964, and again on his release many years later, 
saying that he had always fought white discrimination and black discrimination, “a cause 
for which I hope to be able to live, but for which I am prepared to die”.  Jihadists represent 
a new form of ‘smart bomb’, and, if caught, see capital punishment as a guaranteed 
affordance for martyrdom. 
 
Knorr-Cetina  writes in more detail about fundamentalist terrorism, and the function of 
“transcendental time” in which the individual is “pulled into living-forward towards the 
end of a parallel life … while still part of an ordinary life” (2005: 219).  This temporality, she 
says, fulfils some of the structuring functions previously carried out by Weber’s rational 
authority structures.  
  
Global and metaphysical players      
Identities are played out on various ‘stages’, and the affordances of scale and the profiles 
of these stages is very important: e.g. 9/11, the Munich Olympic Games massacre, 
Buddhist self-immolations in public spaces, the 7/7 bombings in London, etc.  There are a 
range of opportunities, and affordances, for becoming a ‘global’, if not an ‘immortal’ 
player, even if for only 15 minutes of fame.  Serial murderers, and political (and celebrity) 
assassins may aspire to similar status.  They ‘inscribe’ themselves and their actions across 
public space and history, using the mythical symbols of celebrity status, either their own 
or, even more macabrely, that of their victims.   
 
The actor’s identity and capability may be fundamentally affected by the allure of these 
macro-contexts and macro-affordances, which can lead to a perception of the global media 
environment, or even the metaphysical ‘environment’, as loaded with unrivalled 
affordances for threatening civilian populations and simultaneously achieving martyrdom, 
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 See Text and Discourse (Williams 1993) for an introduction to discourse, and the application of 
discourse theory to media analysis and an analysis of civil, military and totalitarian discourse within 
Apartheid.   
 
in quite surprising ways.  And surprise is always an advantage in conflict.  The question 
remains whether 9/11 was indeed ‘unthinkable’.   
 
Social Software and Emergence 
The last 20 years have seen unprecedented, exponential growth in interaction and 
communication via social software.  The quantitative changes (in traffic, growth, and 
revenue) are staggering, but they are not the most important point.  The qualitative and 
structural changes are what concern us here: speed, access, openness and ubiquity, as well 
as the flexibility to manage different identities, spaces, and for new ‘voices’ to be heard 
across the world, in days, or even hours.   
 
Hierarchy, formality, certification, and position are becoming somewhat less relevant than 
they used to be:  “there is still leadership discernable in social networking, but it is 
grounded in and shaped by the morphology of the social networking framework” (Taylor 
2011).  Twitter is a paradigm example, and in 2011 it became the site for a clash between 
the UK judiciary’s “super-injunctions” (against disclosure of celebrity affairs), freedom of 
the press, and personal privacy.  In effect, by publishing names on Twitter in contravention 
of a super-injunction (which prohibits the publishing of the content of the story, but also 
prohibits the publication of the name of the person who applied for the injunction) the 
‘tweeter’ effectively made a mockery of the high court process.  This of course provoked a 
response, but it remains to be seen how effective that will be.   
 
The opportunities for collaboration and for publishing in complex, emerging and adaptive 
networks, outside of conventional social and legal norms, have got potentially profound 
implications.  The range of affordances has increased exponentially and rapidly, even if in 
micro-steps.  Complex adaptive behaviour occurs, broadly speaking, when a large number 
of actors interact and communicate frequently, with large degrees of freedom, but within 
some constraints; none of the actors can see the full picture, but the network of actors 
nevertheless produces emergent, adaptive behaviour (Cilliers, 2005).  As this kinds of social 
collaboration gets embedded as a new (and far more efficient) infrastructure for the way 
people live their lives, it will be increasingly difficult for the Mubarak’s of this world to just 
decide to turn them off (see the discussion of Webworld, below).   
 
 
The New Political Ecology  
Prior to the internet, and within the Weberian structures of the industrial and ‘post’-
industrial societies, freedom of speech, association, and the press could be encouraged to 
behave, or just be shut down by controlling fairly large, expensive, and cumbersome 
institutions – political parties, newspapers, corporate advertisers, etc.   
 
The affordances that were available to articulate and mobilise dissent and opposition were 
highly structured and expensive (typically, national elections once every 4 or 5 years), 
which meant that in a context in which power was perceived to be distributed 
asymmetrically, the only alternative was an asymmetric response: non-violent dissent or, 
failing that, guerrilla warfare, or even terror.  In broad terms, the traditional political 
context can, for our purposes, be differentiated into civil, military and totalitarian 
discourses, and the example of Apartheid South Africa illustrates all three (Williams 1993).  
Control in such societies could in the past be exercised effectively, if brutally, in a ‘closed’ 
system (shifting from civil to military and, if necessary, totalitarian discourse), which can 
maintain power for some time.  Syria and Iran, in 2011-12, were interesting examples of 
societies trying to maintain power in a such ’closed’ context, partly by switching off  
platforms like Facebook on the Internet.  
 
Knorr-Cetina differentiates the politics of the old political ecology from the new very 
clearly in her detailed analysis of the difference between Weberian and post-Weberian 
social structures (see the section on Global Micro-structures, below).  But first it might be 
useful to make some broader points about the communication and interactive 
infrastructure of the early 21
st
 Century.  
 
Webworld 
The distinctions between the ‘old’ world and the new, or between ‘old’ Europe and the 
new are less relevant in a world where one Egyptian commentator on the ‘Arab Spring’ 
demonstrations, said: “Mubarak and the older generation are still living in ‘land-line’ Egypt.  
The demonstrators just don’t recognise that country anymore; they are living in ‘Facebook 
Egypt’” (BBC news, Spring 2011). In Egypt the government was forced to switch it all back 
on after just a few days; in Syria and Iran, major parts of it are permanently off, but it is far 
from ‘leak-proof’.   
This is the same world in which Lucy Annson, from UK Uncut, said in an interview with 
Emily Maitlis of the BBC:  
"We are a network of people who self-organise. We don't have a position on 
things. It's about empowering the individual to go out there and be creative." "But 
is it wrong for individuals to attack buildings?" asked Maitlis. "You'd have to ask 
that particular individual," replied Annson. "But you are a spokesperson for UK 
Uncut," insisted Maitlis. And Annson came out with a wonderful line: "No. I'm a 
spokesperson for myself."  Curtis (2011).  
Contrary to Curtis’s sarcasm (that this is a “wonderful line”) and his incredulity about the 
effectiveness and supposed ‘naivity’ of Annson’s perspective (his central complaint is that 
she has “nothing to say about power”), this is in many ways a very interesting and clear-cut 
articulation of the affordances (the perceptive-action) of ‘the politics of emergence’.  This 
approach has some affinity with previous modes of asymmetric conflict, ‘leaderless 
movements’ or ‘distributed leadership’, but it functions within the totally new social and 
economic infrastructure and context of social software, which radically re-structures public 
and private space, political and non-political discourse, cycles and forms of 
‘representation’, and makes possible a new ‘emergent politics’ in the strict sense of the 
word ‘emergent’ (Cilliers 2005, Williams et al 2011). That is why it is now possible for 
Annson to say ‘the network is the organisation’, which resonates with Sun Microsystems’ 
credo in the late 1990’s that ‘the internet is the computer’.  
The interesting question about the new political ecology is the question of who is in and 
who is out of what might be called ‘webworld’.  The threshold for whether a country is a 
member of Webworld, or not,  can be defined by whether the country is irrevocably 
committed to being ‘switched on’ to technical functions, as well as to political and 
constitutional guarantees, in some of the following areas (listed, loosely, cumulatively): 
 
Universal access   
In telecommunications policy terms, universal access is a minimum guarantee by the State 
– for all people to have access to a service – in this case, the Internet.  It can be 
implemented in a number of ways to supply basic broadband services.  The next level of 
policy is to even out urban/rural provision, which is complicated by the privatisation of 
services.  
 
The ‘global’ nature of the internet changes the nature of political and economic 
infrastructure and governance, and social software restructures the nature of the ‘social’, 
particularly public, private and anonymous ‘spaces’.   
 
Constitutional Rights 
Constitutional rights have not caught up with the Internet.   Countries that are radically 
changing their constitutions (e.g. Egypt, in 2011-12) might consider whether to include, in 
some way, the provision not only of general rights, but also of ‘digital rights’.  For instance, 
freedom of speech, of the press, and more interestingly, of assembly, could be formulated 
to expressly guarantee rights such as the right to ‘digital assembly’.  
 Universal Human Rights 
Universal Human Rights, too, have yet to take account of ‘digital rights’.  Although these 
rights are ‘universal’, they are generally formulated as being desirable within sovereign 
states. But the internet is global, which is making some of these rights (e.g. to privacy) 
difficult to govern,  if not sometimes absurd (see above).  The difficulty is that these rights 
need to be formulated across sovereign states, not just within them.  Exceptions to 
international governance, such as the refusal of the USA to sign up to the provisions of the 
International Criminal Court, indicate that such global agreement on governance of these 
issues might be a long time coming.   
 
Universal rights (in the literal sense of the term), to access, publication and assembly, 
across what is left of the borders of sovereign states, is an odd thing for sovereign states to 
endorse, and could well be a difficult thing for national politicians to sell to their 
electorates.  
 
Economic thresholds 
More fundamental, perhaps, to the issue of the thresholds for ‘webworld’ is whether a 
country is irrevocably economically committed, in practice (rather than in policy) to the 
Internet, because large sections of the country does business that way.  This includes 
(again, roughly cumulatively): email, access to information, e-business and e-commerce, as 
well as a number of services (e.g. tax, health care, etc) which are increasingly embedded 
within the Internet.  Many countries are already ‘living in the Cloud’ to some extent.  Cloud 
computing is not tied to ‘sovereign states’, and is becoming ‘global’ in the sense outlined 
below.   
 
 
Global Microstructures 
Sovereign states are still important in international politics, and the governments of many 
of these states are determined not to cross some of the thresholds of webworld, or at the 
very least, to hold onto the absolute right to revoke them.  It remains to be seen how 
realistic this is in the future, technically, economically and politically.  But there are some  
interesting examples of how some of the new ‘social morphologies’ of the digital world 
have already established themselves in radically new global microstructures, across 
sovereign states, particularly in global finance and terrorism (Knorr-Cetina 2005).  
 
Knorr-Cetina sets out the foundations for a theory of micro-globalisation and the new 
global architectures of a world society.  There are several interesting aspects to this.  To 
start with, a micro-global structure is not ‘inter-national’, as it is not based in cooperation 
or coordination between nation states; in many ways it functions separately from them
14
.  
It is also not a ‘network’ in the conventional sense of the term, as it includes inter-
subjective associations (“rich” and “textured” communities – see below).  And finally, a 
micro-global structure is, in Knorr-Cetina’s terms, ‘light’ – it achieves global penetration 
quickly and cheaply, the digitally networked version of a network of the classic “war of the 
flea”.  Microglobal structures are something of a paradox; they are not based on the large, 
formal, rational structures of Weberian bureaucracies.  Rather, they are “fields of practice 
that link up and stretch across all time zones (or have the potential to do so), [and they] 
need not imply further expansions of social institutional complexity.  In fact, they may 
become feasible only if they avoid complex institutional structures”. (+) (Knorr-Cetina 2004: 
214).  
 
Knorr-Cetina’s microglobal structures are based on several central characteristics of 
complex, emergent structures, and their accompanying affordances, including:  
 
• Light, open, emergent, adaptive systems and behaviour. 
• Self-organising principles and patterns, often operating close to (the edge of) 
chaos. 
• Asymmetries, unpredictability and playfulness. 
• Reflexive amplification and augmentation. 
• Temporal rather than spatial structures and organisation.  
 
It is worthwhile to explore these characteristics in more detail.   
 
The Internet has long been said to have changed society and the economy (Castells, 2001). 
The world has ‘shrunk’, and everyone can get in touch with everyone else on the planet, 
instantly, and at very low cost.  As a consequence, several crucial aspects of social 
structure have shifted, substantially, including the boundaries and the relationships 
between adult and child, private and public space, personal and global communication, 
organisational-  and user-generated content, and access to, and the business model of,   
publication and participation in public discussion and debate (both trivial and serious).  
 
However, Knorr-Cetina’s micro-global structures (of finance and terrorism) go beyond 
these aspects of “spacialisation”, and are based instead on “temporalisation” –  the 
continuous, iterative 24/7 cycle of time zones, which replaces the rationality of the 
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 The closest heritage for ‘global microstructures’ is probably the ‘Trans-national Company’ - a later 
version of the ‘Multi-national Company’ – but neither of these are ‘light’.  
Weberian institutional structures (of modernism, and of consumerist post-modernism) 
with “sequentialisation”,  which is not tied to any particular time zone or place, or ‘host 
nation’.  It also provides temporally structured instability, with continuous de-generation 
and re-generation of the system which, far from being a disadvantage, is vital to complex 
emergent systems, adaptability, and innovation
15
.        
 
Temporalisation is an ‘emergent structure’: adaptive, unpredictable, flexible (uncoupled 
from location and the current ‘host’ country), yet still ‘ordered’ by the rhythms and cycles 
of time zones,  and it relies on “reflexive amplification and augmentation”.  Knorr-Cetina 
writes that the strategies of terrorist microglobal structures  
 
… seek and exploit the potential for disproportionalities between input and output 
or effort and effect … (which) can be distilled … from the use of technology, from 
scientific and other innovations, and from ‘media’ of various kinds used as 
amplifying and multiplying systems. Global microstructures may also derive 
disproportionality benefits from decoupling internal operations from support 
structures that provide for the conditions under which operations can remain light; 
‘outsourcings’ of this kind also point away from the inclusive notion of an internally 
rationalized system. Finally, lightness may emerge in response to de- or under-
regulation, which create the space for an adaptive and adaptable self-organization 
(2005:216) 
 
And she continues that global finance, in particular, includes  
 
… a level of intersubjectivity that derives from the character of these markets as 
reflexively observed by participants in temporal continuity, synchronicity and 
immediacy. These markets are communities of time, but in a different sense than 
the terrorist groups for which disconnections and ‘structural holes’ are a 
characteristic of operative practice. Though global microstructures tend to be flat 
rather than hierarchically organized systems, they are at the same time highly  
textured systems. The specific textures re-specify and may in fact contradict  
[traditional] assumptions about network structures. ( Knorr-Cetina, 2005: 217).   
  
Clearly the affordances of such microstructures are quite different from the affordances of 
more traditional Weberian organisation.  Complex behaviour and complex structures 
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 Of course the global financial system got far too innovative in the multiple-derivatives products 
that it produced in the ‘noughties’, but that does not mean that the baby should be thrown out with 
the bathwater.  The lesson is perhaps that global, and specifically unstable, systems are more prone 
to ‘overshoot’ than any others, and are therefore more in need of truly global regulation.    
provide radically more open affordances, or more flexible opportunities for a range of 
unpredictable affordances, and unpredictable behaviour.  One of the benefits of Knorr-
Cetina’s analysis is that she:  i) identifies the micro as a key (if not the key) level of 
articulation of such adaptive and innovative behaviour, and that ii) her choice of 
terminology (‘complex microstructures’) emphasises the paradox of complex systems, 
namely that although they are unstable, unpredictable, they are none the less ordered (see 
above).  This is a far cry from the world of ‘uses’ and ‘compliance’ that characterises 
Weberian organisation and its accompanying styles of management
16
.   Knorr-Cetina 
succeeds in laying the foundations for a theory of microglobalization, which is a world 
apart from the platitudes of ‘think global, act local’.  The theory of microglobalization is 
“the view that the texture of a global world becomes articulated through microstructural 
patterns that develop in the shadow of (but liberated from) national and local institutional 
patterns.  Microglobalization implies that ... the micro in the form indicated instantiates 
the macro; micro-principles enable and implement macro-extension and macroeffects” 
(2005: 214-215). 
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 Snowden and Boone (2007) is a very useful account of the issues facing management and 
leadership in a world where both complex and predictable events have to be managed.  
Conclusion 
The way we communicate and interact in 2011 is still changing rapidly, and even after 20 
years of the internet, web 4.0 (the internet of things) promises to continue that process.   
 
As a global community, we write, communicate, talk, and create and exchange information 
exponentially more every decade, if not every year.  Who ‘we’ are is changing too, and is 
becoming deeply embedded in networks which, although they may look similar to earlier, 
pre-internet networks, have changed fundamentally
17
.  We need a new theory of 
communication and interaction, to enable us to understand what is going on, and how to 
respond to both the opportunities and the problems that arise.  
 
There are two aspects to this: i) we are now, literally, a global community, and ii) we face 
many problems that require a sophisticated global awareness and can only be responded 
to at a global level, such as international finance, terrorism and ecological crises.  A broadly 
ecological theory is required, to respond to the scale and the dynamic inter-connectedness 
of what is happening.  Gibson’s theory of affordances provides a foundation for thinking 
about how we perceive-and-act within an explicitly ‘ecological’ psychology, and several 
others, including Costall, Reid, Noë and Ramachandran have all taken this forward in 
various ways, in terms of theory and in terms of testing it against actual practice.  
 
This paper has put some ideas together on how the innovativeness and creativity of 
affordances ‘percolates through’ social and political action and interaction, and leave 
traces,  residues, or artefacts in the form of uses, memes and, interestingly, Blackmore’s 
‘temes’ (technological memes).   This is a dynamic process, and in a sense there ‘will always 
be another affordance’, even after we think all the possible uses have been exhausted.  
Nevertheless, it is argued that we need to acknowledge both the dynamic interaction 
between uses and affordances, as well as the difference between the two.   
 
Knorr-Cetina’s theory and case studies of microglobal structures provides a crucial advance 
in the debate about the way that changes in the social and economic modes of production 
provide affordances for radically new ‘social morphologies’, in fields such as finance, 
terrorism, political mobilisation and ‘self-representation’.  The notion of self-organising 
actors in emergent, adaptive systems includes both the sense of representing the self, as a 
participant in a network, and the sense of spontaneously creating your own affordances – 
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 One might even say that the traditional theory of mind (and theories of time and space, see 
above) need to be fundamentally reconceptualised, as they are all taking on radically new, more 
flexible, and even unstable properties.  
your own forms of (self-organised) representation and participation within a network of 
the like-minded, and within a time-frame and cycle which you determine.   
 
The old forms of social structure and interaction have not disappeared; many will survive, 
but those that don’t will not necessarily even be contested.  Instead, new forms of social 
interaction are emerging in parallel, and in true ecological fashion, the forms of interaction 
and representation that turn out to be irrelevant will just fade into obscurity.  What is 
important for the argument here is that dynamic, uncertain, unpredictable, reflexive, and 
even unstable (yet ordered) social structures and forms are, ironically, ‘establishing’ 
themselves.  We need different theories to describe what is happening and why it is 
happening, and we can make a start on this if we combine a theory of how people act 
(affordances), how the modes of communication and interaction have changed (the 
internet, and the affordances of the micro/global ), and how new global/unstable forms of 
political and economic ‘commerce’ are emerging and, already, becoming established ‘uses’ 
in the world-wide web.  
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